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ABSTRACT	X.509	Certificates	are	used	by	a	wide	range	of	technologies	to	verify	 identities,	while	 the	SSL	protocol	 is	used	 to	provide	a	secure	encrypted	tunnel	through	which	data	can	be	sent	over	a	public	network.	Combined	both	of	these	technologies	provides	the	 basis	 of	 the	 public	 key	 infrastructure	 (PKI).	 While	 the	concept	of	PKI	is	a	good	idea,	the	different	implementation	of	the	technologies	in	different	operating	system	and	clients	often	lead	 to	 weaknesses.	 This	 paper	 proposes	 a	 methodology	 to	automate	the	testing	of	SSL	clients	by	generating		both	bogus	and	 malformed	 certificates	 in	 order	 to	 evaluate	 the	 client’sresponse	 and	 identify	 potential	 threats	 to	 network	infrastructures.	1
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1	 INTRODUCTION	Certificates	 play	 an	 important	 part	 in	 validating	 the	authenticity	of	 the	server	that	a	client	 is	connecting	to,	while	the	Secure	Socket	Layer	(SSL)	protocol	 is	used	to	provide	an	encrypted	 tunnel	 through	which	 traffic	 can	be	 securely	 sent.	Together,	 certificates	 and	 the	 SSL	 protocol	 provide	 the	cornerstone	upon	which	PKI	is	built	[1].			To	verify	a	server,	a	certificate	authority	(CA)	like	Godaddy	or	 VeriSign	 can	 be	 used	 to	 sign	 a	 certificate,	 thus	 leaving	 a	signature	 on	 the	 signed	 certificate	 by	 the	 CA.	When	a	 client	wants	to	verify	that	a	server’s	certificate	is	valid	the	signature	
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of	the	CA	is	examined.	If	the	signature	is	determined	to	be	valid,	then	the	server’s	certificate	is	deemed	to	be	valid	as	well.	In	a	recent	Apple	SSL	security	bug	it	was	discovered	that	an	invalid	X.509	certificate	present	on	a	server	allowed	Apple	clients	to	access	the	server		as	if	the	certificate	was	valid		[2].	However,	when		using	an	alternative	client	an	error	screen	was	returned	to	the	client	indicating	the	invalidity	of	the	certificate,	which	is	the	expected	result.		This	Apple	bug	highlights	one	of	the	key	problems	of	the	SSL	protocol	in	that	the	developers	are	allowed	to	implement	the	 protocol	 in	 different	 ways	 and	 this	 could	 lead	 to	 the	protocol	behaving	differently	between	implementations.	While	the	SSL	protocol	provides	a	 secure	 layer,	 it	 is	critical	 for	 the	protocol	 to	 be	 implemented	 uniformly	 as	 described	 by	 the	standard.		The	contribution	of	this	work	are	as	follows:	
• Reviewing	the	current	state	of	PKI.	
• Presenting	 a	 methodology	 which	 can	 be	 used	 for	evaluating	weaknesses	in	the	PKI	The	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 organised	 as	 follows,	Section	 2	 presents	 the	 background	 on	 PKI	 and	 X.509	certificates	while	also	describing	the	SSL	handshaking	process	used	 to	 authenticate	 clients.	 Section	 3	 describes	 the	methodology	that	will	be	used	to	test	 the	SSL	clients	 for	any	potential	problems,	while	in	Section	4	the	test	results	from	the	execution	of	the	methodology	are	presented	and	discussed.	The	paper	ends	with	the	conclusions	and	future	work	in	Section	5.		
2	 BACKGROUND	The	PKI	is	a	method	of	providing	authentication	and	secure	communication	over	a	public	network	like	the	Internet.	The	main	components	of	a	PKI	are	as	follows	[3]:	
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1. Digital	Certificates 
2. Certificate	Authority(CA) 
2.1	 Digital	Certificates	A	server	will	typically	use	an	X.509	digital	certificate	to	validate	its	identity	to	a	client.	The	validation	of	the	server’s	identify	is	underpinned	by	getting	a	CA	to	validate	its	identity.	 The	 SSL	 Protocol	 is	 used	 in	 conjunction	 with	 X.509	certificates	 to	 authenticate	 the	 server	 that	 the	 client	 is	connecting	to,	along	with	providing	encryption	mechanisms	to	protect	the	data	flow	between	the	client	and	the	server	[4].	When	 an	 SSL	 client	 connects	 to	 a	 server	 the	 handshake	process	shown	in	Figure	1	[5]	is	executed.	When	this	process	has	completed	the	client	will	have	authenticated	the	server	as	well	as	negotiated	an	encrypted	tunnel.		As	shown	in	Figure	1,	 the	process	begins	with	the	client	connecting	 to	 the	 server	 by	 sending	 a	ClientHello	message.	This	message	contains	a	list	of	supported	ciphers	supported	by	the	client	(e.g.	MD5,	SHA1,	etc.)	along	with	a	random	number	generated	by	the	client.	The	 second	 step	 in	 the	SSL	protocol	 is	 for	 the	 server	 to	respond	 to	 the	 client	 with	 its	 own	 message	 called	 the	
ServerHello.	This	message	contains	a	list	of	ciphers	supported	by	the	server	along	with	a	random	number	generated	by	the	server.	In	addition	the	Certificate	message	contains	the	server’s	public	key	and	hostname	which	have	been	digitally	signed	by	a	CA.	Note	however,	that	it	 is	the	responsibility	of	the	client	to	authenticate	the	certificate.	
	
Figure	1:	Basic	SSL	Handshake	Exchange	The	client’s	next	step	is	to	create	the	pre-master	key	which	will	be	used	to	form	the	session	key	for	encrypting	the	traffic	between	the	client	and	the	server.	The	pre-master	key	will	be	encrypted	using	the	server’s	public	key,	which	was	exchanged	in	the	ServerHello	message.	The	ClientKeyExchange	message	is	 then	used	to	transmit	the	encrypted	pre-master	key	to	the	server.		When	the	ClientKeyExchange	message	is	received	by	the	server	the	pre-master	key	will	be	decrypted	using	the	server’s	private	 key.	 Both	 the	 Client	 and	 Server	 will	 now	 be	 able	 to	derive	the	same	session	key	for	encrypting	the	traffic	by	using	
the	random	numbers	sent	by	the	ClientHello	and	ServerHello	messages	and	the	pre-master	key.	The	final	step	in	the	SSL	process	is	for	the	client	and	server	to	negotiate	the	ciphers	that	are	being	used.	This	is	done	using	a	final	message	called	the	ChangeCipherSpec.		Once	 this	 process	 is	 complete	 a	 secure	 communication	path	between	the	server	and	the	client	will	be	established.	
2.2	 Certificate	Authorities	When	 PKI	 is	 used	 one	 area	 of	 concern	 that	 needs	 to	 be	addressed	 is	 how	 servers	 are	 authenticated.	 To	 help	accomplish	this	a	body	called	a	CA	can	be	used.		The	 CA	 is	 responsible	 for	 taking	 an	 application	 from	 a	server	and	verifying	that	they	are	the	legitimate	owner	of	the	domain	that	they	are	trying	to	authenticate.	For	example,	if	a	server	 submits	 an	 application	 for	 bank.com	 the	 CA	 will	 be	responsible	for	verifying	that	the	application	is	from	the	server	who	 owns	 the	 website	 and	 not	 a	 hacker	 trying	 to	 set	 up	 a	phishing	website	to	attract	unsuspecting	customers	[4]		
2.2.1 Problems with CA The	idea	of	getting	a	third	party	to	verify	the	ownership	of	a	website	is	a	sound	idea,	however	it	has	been	proven	that	the	checks	that	a	CA	performs	to	verify	the	identity	of	a	website	can	be	circumvented.		There	have	been	instances	in	the	past	where	a	CA	has	not	performed	 the	 necessary	 checks	 and	 issued	 certificates	 to	customers	when	they	should	not	have	[4].	This	behaviour	led	to	uncertainty	and	lack	of	trust	in	the	PKI	infrastructure	[6]		In	order	to	gain	a	good	level	of	trust	the	CA	must	offer	a	robust	 verification	 process	 that	 focuses	 on	 verifying	 the	credentials	of	the	customer	[7].	
2.3	 X.509	Certificates	Within	 the	PKI	 there	 is	 a	key	 requirement	 to	verify	 that	 the	server,	a	client	 is	trying	to	establish	a	secure	communication	with,	 is	 legitimate.	 The	 mechanism	 through	 which	 this	 is	achieved	 is	 based	 upon	 X.509	 certificates.	 The	 general	structure	of	an	X.509v3	certificate	is	shown	in	Figure	2	[8].		 
	
Figure	2:	X.509	Certificate	Structure	
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2.3.1 ASN Formatting The	general	format	of	an	X.509	certificate	is	defined	by	using	an	Abstract	Syntax	Notation	One	(ASN1)	[3],	which	is	an	artificial	language,	used	for	describing	data	and	data	structures.	While	the	X.509	certificate	is	used	to	specify	the	format	of	a	 certificate,	 it	 does	 not	 dictate	 how	 the	 encoding	 is	 being	achieved.	 This	 means	 that	 one	 implementation	 of	 the	 ASN1	encoding	rules	can	differ	from	another	[4],	leading	to	potential	vulnerabilities		in	a	version	of	the	ASN1	rules.	
2.3.2 X.509 Certificate Field Names This	section	examines	the	structure	of	an	X.509v3	certificate	by	discussing	 some	 of	 the	 common	 fields	 used	 to	 create	 a	certificate	as	shown	in	Figure	2.		The	Common	Name	(CN)	is	the	most	important	field	as	it	is	 used	 to	 indicate	 the	 name	 of	 the	 website	 that	 is	 being	connected	 to	 [8].	 If	 the	 certificate	 is	 for	 the	 domain	 name	corresponding	 to	 www.google.com,	 then	 when	 the	 domain	name	is	entered	as	a	URL	in	a	web	browser	it	is	expected	that	both	the	URL	field	in	the	browser	and	in	the	certificate	match.	If	 the	 names	 are	 different	 then	 a	 warning	 message	 will	 be	displayed.		The	 CA	 also	 uses	 this	 field	 to	 verify	 the	 identity	 of	 the	owner	for	the	website	by	taking	the	URL	specified	in	the	CN	and	performing	a	DNS lookup.	The	information	specified	in	the	DNS	lookup	 is	 compared	against	 the	 information	 supplied	 on	 the	application	to	verify	that	there	are	no	irregularities.	If	all	fields	match	then	a	certificate	is		issued.	The	normal	procedure	is	to	just	verify	the	CN,	but	in	cases	where	a	 company	wants	 to	give	 the	 users	 connecting	 to	 the	website	a	higher	degree	of	confidentiality,		an	additional	step	called	the	Extended	validation	check	can	be	provided.		This	extended	validation	process	 is	used	to	try	and	stop	hackers	creating	phishing	websites.	For	example,	a	hacker	can	successfully	register	the	domain	bankofscotland.net.	When	an	application	 is	 made	 to	 a	 CA	 for	 an	 X.509	 certificate,	 the	certificate	will	be	granted,	as	the	hacker		is	the	legitimate	owner	of	the	domain	name.		The	 extended	 validation	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 takes	 the	process	a	step	further	by	performing	a	more	in-depth	check	of	the	domain	by	verifying	that	the	domain	actually	belongs	to	the	company,	as	well	as	verifying	 that	the	 company	 is	 legitimate	and	 that	 they	 are	 not	 trying	 to	 impersonate	 another	organisation.	A	check	will	also	be	made	against	the	content	that	the	domain	is	serving	to	make	sure	that	it	is	legitimate.		This	process	is	typically	undertaken	by	large	corporations	since	 they	 are	 able	 to	 afford	 the	 additional	 costs	 in	 going	through	 the	 more	 rigorous	 verification	 process.	 In	 a	 web	browser	 an	 extended	 validation	 certificate	 is	 displayed	 as	 a	green	title	bar.	 The	signature	algorithm	is	used	to	indicate	the	type	of	hash	algorithms	supported	by	the	server	hosting	the	certificate.	The	hash	algorithms	 range	 from	MD5	 to	SHA.	Due	 to	 the	proven	
MD5	collisions	[4]	and	weaknesses	with	SHA1	it	means	that	at	a	minimum	SHA256	should	be	used	for	hashing	[9].		The	validity	period	is	used	to	specify	the	period	through	which	the	X.509	certificate	is	valid	for.	Two	fields	make	up	the	validity	 period	 and	 they	 are	 notbefore	 and	 notafter.	 The	
notbefore	field	is	used	to	set	a	start	date	while	the		notafter	field	is	used	to	set	an	end	date	for	the	certificate	validity.	In	 most	 cases	 the	 time	 period	 specified	 for	 the	 validity	period	will	be	set	to	a	 low	number,	anywhere	between	1	–	5	years.	With	the	increasing	computational	power	and	the	rise	of	quantum	computing,	weaknesses	 in	the	algorithms	used	may	be	discovered,	hence	a	short	time	period	is	better	for	security	reasons.	[8].		The	public	key	field	will	be	populated	when	a	certificate	is	generated	 [10].	 The	 certificate	 contains	 general	 information	about	the	holder	and	the	public	key	will	be	embedded	in	the	certificate.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 public	 key	 being	 created	 a	corresponding	private	key	will	also	be	created.		The	public	and	private	keys	are	components	used	in	the	PKI	to	help	create	a	secure	communication	path	between	two	entities.		When	a	CA	first	starts	out	it	will	create	a	root	certificate	that	can	be	used	to	sign	other	certificates.	This	certificate	will	be	used	to	create	what	is	called	an	intermediate	certificates	(IC)	and	these	will	be	used	by	an	intermediate	authoritie	(IA)	to	sign	certificates.		The	main	reason	why	the	root	certificate	is	not	used	to	sign	the	certificates	 is	 that	 if	 it	 is	 stolen	or	compromised	then	all	certificates	signed	by	the	CA	would	be	at	risk.	By	getting	the	IA	to	sign	the	certificates	using	the	IC,	it	means	that	the	root	CA	is	protected	and	only	used	to	create	ICs.		Once	an	IA	has	obtained	the	IC,	it	can	in	turn	create	its	own	IC.	Each	time	an	IC	is	created	the	chain	that	is	included	in	the	certificate	will	be	updated.	This	chain	shows	the	path	that	has	been	taken	to	create	the	certificate.	This	means	that	all	ICs	used	to	create	the	current	certificate	will	be	 included,	 terminating	with	the	root	CA.		By	 following	 this	process,	 if	 one	 IC	 is	 violated	 then	only	that	 certificate	 is	 made	 invalid	 and	 therefore	 only	 the	certificates	signed	with	it	will	required	to	be	reprocessed	[5].	Each	 time	 a	 CA	 issues	 a	 certificate	 a	 serial	 number	identifying	 the	 certificate	 is	 associated	 with	 it.	 This	 serial	number	 should	 be	 unique	 and	 not	 repeated	 in	 any	 other	certificate	issued	by	the	CA	[11].	The	country	field	is	a	2	character	field	used	to	identify	the	country	of	origin	the	certificate	is	located	in.	The	 final	 field	that	will	 be	examined	is	 the	Organisation	Unit	(OU)	field.	This	field	is	used	to	 indicate	the	organisation	that	the	certificate	belongs	to.	 
2.4		 Creating	X.509	Certificates	
There are two options for creating certificates, the first option is 
called self-signed while the second option uses what is called a 
CA.  
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Self-signing	allows	system	administrators	to	create	their	own	 root	 certificate	and	use	 it	 to	 sign	 their	own	certificates.	While	this	is	a	cost	saving	option,	it	has	the	disadvantage	that	the	 identity	 of	 their	 server	 is	 not	 proven	 by	 a	 recognised	authority	[1].		The	 self-signing	 process	 should	 only	 be	 used	 when	 the	client	 is	 connecting	 to	 internal	 servers	and	 there	 is	absolute	trust	in	the	server	they	are	establishing	a	connection	with.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	root	certificate	generated	is	not	included	in	the	root	store	of	the	web	browser.	This	means	that	when	the	SSL	client	browses	to	the	website	an	error	message	will	be	shown	indicating	that	the	connection	cannot	be	trusted.		The	 user	will	 typically	 ignore	 the	warning	message	and	proceed	 to	 the	website.	This	 behaviour	 is	 fine	 if	 the	 user	 is	going	to	a	trusted	website	that	they	know,	but	there	is	evidence	that	they	also	do	this	when	going	to	untrusted	websites	which	can	end	up	being	a	security	risk	[12].		An	alternative	to	using	self-signed	certificates	is	to	use	a	CA.	The	purpose	of	the	CA	is	to	provide	a	mechanism	whereby	the	 identity	of	 the	owner	of	 the	website	can	be	verified	by	a	third	party	and	thus	increasing	trust.	
2.4.1  OpenSSL For	creating	X.509	certificates	there	are	a	range	of	Application	Program	Interfaces	(APIs)	available	that	can	be	used.	The	most	popular	API	is	called	OpenSSL	[13].	OpenSSL	 is	 an	 open	 source	 implementation	 of	 the	 SSL	protocol	 that	 allows	 the	 use	 of	 various	 cryptographic	algorithms	 such	 as	 AES,	 DES,	 and	 RSA	 to	 create	 X.509	certificates	[14].	The	advantage	of	OpenSSL	is	that	it	is	available	on	many	different	platforms	including	Windows	and	Linux.	However	one	of	OpenSSL	 greatest	 strength	 is	 one	 of	 its	weaknesses	in	that	with	it	being	an	open	source	project	there	is	the	danger	that	the	code	has	not	been	fully	verified	via	the	use	of	code	reviews	[15].	This	could	lead	to	exploits	as	was	seen	with	the	heart	bleed	bug	[16].	The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 will	 focus	 on	 describing	 a	methodology	which	can	be	used	for	testing	for	weaknesses	in	how	the	SSL	protocol	has	been	implemented	in	clients.	
3.	 PROCEDURE	This	 section	 provides	 a	 high-level	 overview	 of	 the	 proposed	methodology	for	testing	SSL.		This	methodology	will	be	used	for	finding	weaknesses	in	an	SSL	implementation	as	well	as	being	able	 to	 be	 used	 to	 identify	 differences	 in	 how	 SSL	 functions	between	different	implementations.	The	 block	 diagram	 in	 Figure	 3	 shows	 how	 the	methodology	works.		
	
Figure	3:	Methodology	Block	Diagram	
3.1	 Compose	Tests	The	 compose	 tests	 procedure	 requires	 the	 creation	 of	 a	configuration	 file	 containing	 the	 tests	 that	 are	 going	 to	 be	generated	by	the	methodology.	The	format	of	the	configuration	file	is	shown	in	Figure	4.		The	tests	will	be	created	programmatically	via	the	use	of	the	Python	programming	language	and	the	OpenSSL	API.	The	code	will	be	designed	to	be	modular	so	that	a	programmer	will	be	able	to	create	new	tests	as	required.		
	
Figure	4:	Test	Configuration	File	The	format	of	the	file	starts	with	a	test	name,	in	this	case	the	first	test	is	named	TEST1.	The	test	name	is	used	to	create	a	directory	containing	the	generated	HTML	page	alongside	the	generated	X.509	certificates.		The	option	parameter	in	the	configuration	file	is	used	to	specify	the	test	that	is	going	to	be	executed.	Figure	4	shows	that	
TEST1	executes	the	NULLCN	option,	which	produces	an	X.509	certificate	with	a	null	character	in	the	common	name	field.		
3.2	 Generate	Tests	Function	The	 purpose	 of	 the	 Generate	 Test	 function	 is	 to	 take	 the	generated	configuration	file	that	has	been	created	and	perform	the	following	steps	:		 
1. Generate	Directories	for	each	test 	2. Generate		an	Apache	configuration	file	for	each	test		
3. Generate	an	HTML	page	for	each	test 	Each	of	these	steps	will	be	examined	in	the	next	sections		
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3.2.1  Generate Directories The	 aim	 of	 the	 generate	 directories	 function	 is	 to	 create	 a	unique	directory	based	upon	the	test	name.	This	function	will	first	examine	the	current	directory	structure	and	if	 it	detects	that	 there	are	 files	 left	 over	 from	a	previous	 test	 then	it	will	delete	them.	This	ensures	that	the	test	will	be	starting	from	a	blank	slate.	
3.2.2  Generate Apache Website Configuration Once	the	directory	structure	has	been	created	the	next	step	is		to	create	the	Apache	configuration	file.	This	configuration	file	contains	 the	 directory	 locations	 of	 the	 root	 of	 each	 website	generated	along	with	where	the	generated	X.509	certificate	and	key	are	located.	The	 final	 step	executed	 in	 the	Generate	Apache	Website	function	is	to	generate	a	unique	HTML	page	for	each	test	based	upon	 the	 option	 parameter	 in	 the	 configuration	 file.	 The	generate	HTML	file	process	will	be	used	 to	uniquely	 identify	each	test	that	will	be	executed	by	the	client.	Once	this	process	has	finished	the	methodology	will	then	proceed	 to	 the	 next	 step	 in	 Figure	 4,	 which	 is	 the	 Generate	Certificate	procedure.	
3.3	 Generate	Certificate	The	purpose	of	the	generate	certificate	function	is	to	generate	unique	X.509	certificates	that	contain	errors.	Each	item	in	the	configuration	file	will	be	processed	and	an	X.509	certificate	will	be	generated	and	placed	in	 the	corresponding	directory	 that	was	created	during	the	Generate	Test	function.	
3.4	 Test	Scenarios	This	 section	 discusses	 the	 test	 Scenarios	 generated	 for	 the	methodology	along	with	what	the	expected	result	of	each	test	is.	 Table	 1	 shows	 the	 list	 of	 tests	 that	 are	 generated	 by	 the	methodology	along	with	the	expected	outcomes.		
Table	1:	List	of	Tests	Test	Name	 Result	WrongKey	 Fail	 Ä	SwapStartEnd	 Fail	 Ä	MissingStart	 Fail	 Ä	MissingEnd	 Fail	 Ä	LongEnd	 Pass	 √	NullCN	 Fail	 Ä	FOOCN	 Fail	 Ä	TabCN	 Fail	 Ä	BackspaceCN	 Fail	 Ä	LongOU	 Fail	 Ä	LongRandomSerial	 Fail	 Ä	SameSerial	 Fail	 Ä	
	
3.4.1 WrongKey Test The	WrongKey	 test	will	 sign	 the	 X.509	certificate	 using	 the	wrong	key.	This	means	that	the	certificate	will	be	invalid.	When	an	SSL	client	encounters	the	certificate	 it	 is	expected	that	an	error	message	will	be	generated	and	as	result	block	the	website	from	loading.		
3.4.2 SwapStartEnd Test The	SwapStartEnd	test		generates	a	certificate	with	the	start	and	the	end	date	swapped.	Thus	a	certificate	which	is	supposed	to	have	a	start	date	of	25/01/18	and	an	end	date	of	25/08/24	will	instead	be	swapped	so	that	the	start	data	will	be	25/08/24	and	the	end	date	will	be	25/01/18.		It	 is	 expected	 that	 when	 an	 SSL	 client	 encounters	 this	certificate	 that	 a	 warning	 page	 is	 displayed	 stating	 that	 the	certificate	 is	 invalid	 and	 the	 website	 will	 be	 blocked	 from	loading.	
3.4.3  MissingStart Test The	MissingStart	test	will	generate	a	certificate	that	has	the	start	date	missing	from	the	certificate.	It	is	expected	that	when	an	SSL	 client	encounters	 this	 certificate	 that	a	warning	page	will	be	displayed	stating	that	the	certificate	is	invalid	and	the	website	will	be	blocked	from	loading.	
3.4.4  MissingEnd Test The	MissingEnd	test	will	generate	a	certificate	that	has	the	end	date	missing	from	the	certificate.	 It	is	expected	that	when	an	SSL	client	encounters	this	certificate	that	a	warning	page	will	be	 displayed	 stating	 that	 the	 certificate	 is	 invalid	 and	 the	website	will	be	blocked	from	loading.	
3.4.5  LongEnd Test The	LongEnd	test	will	generate	a	certificate	with	an	end	date	that	is	far	off	in	the	future,	which	in	this	case	will	be	50	years.		Normally	a	certificate	will	have	an	end	date	that	 is	5-10	years	 in	the	 future	and	it	will	 be	 interesting	 to	 see	 if	an	SSL	client	 can	handle	an	end	 date	 that	 is	50	 years	 in	 the	 future.	When	 an	SSL	 client	 encounters	 this	 certificate	 it	 is	 expected	that	no	error	messages	will	be	displayed	and	it	will	allow	access	to	the	website.	
3.4.6  NullCN Test The	NullCN	test	will	insert	a	null	character	(\0)	in	the	common	name	of	an	X.509	certificate.	Ideally	the	encoding	routine	used	should	reject	 this	 invalid	common	name,	as	NULL	characters	should	not	be	allowed.		
3.4.7  FooCN Test The	FooCN	 test	will	 include	 a	 different	 common	 name	 than	what	is	expected.	The	website	will	be	using	the	domain	name	of	 localhost.example.com	 but	 when	 the	 FOOCN	 option	 is	specified	a	different	common	name	will	be	used	which	in	this	case	will	be	localhost.foo.com.		
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It	 is	 expected	 that	 when	 the	 browser	 encounters	 a	certificate	 with	 a	 common	 name	 that	 is	 different	 from	 the	domain	name	then	a	warning	message	will	be	displayed	and	the	website	will	not	be	loaded.	
3.4.8  TabCN Test The	 TabCN	 test	 will	 insert	 a	 tab	 escape	 character	 into	 the	common	name.	Like	with	the	NULLCN	test	it	is	expected	that	the	 tab	 escape	 character	 will	 be	 rejected	 by	 the	 encoding	routines.		
3.4.9  BackspaceCN Test The	BackspaceCN	test	will	insert	a	backspace	escape	character	into	 the	 common	 name.	 Like	 with	 the	NULLCN	 option	 it	 is	expected	that	the	tab	escape	character	will	be	rejected	by	the	encoding	routines.	
3.4.10  LongOU Test TheLongOU	test	will	use	a	long	character	string	and	attempt	to	overflow	the	string	buffer	used	to	store	the	organizational	unit	name.		
3.4.11  LongRandomSerial Test The	LongRandomSerial	test	will	generate	a	large	number	that	would	 not	 normally	 be	 seen	 on	 an	 X.509	 certificate.	 It	 is	expected	that	there	will	be	an	upper	limit	to	the	length	of	the	serial	 number	 and	 that	 the	 test	 will	 fail	 due	 to	 an	 invalid	number	being	used.	
3.4.12  SameSerial Test The	SameSerial	will	generate	the	same	serial	number	for	two	X.509	 certificates.	 It	 is	 expected	 that	 when	 an	 SSL	 client	encounters	a	certificate	with	 the	 same	serial	number	 from	a	different	certificate	then	the	website	will	fail	to	load.	 
4.		RESULTS	AND	DISCUSSION	In	this	section,	the	results	from	the	experiments	are	presented	in	the	same	order	as	described	in	the	test	scenario	section.	Each	of	the	tests	will	be	executed	using	the	following	software	configurations	as	shown	in	Table	2.		
Table2:	Test	Configurations	Test	Configuration	 Operating	System	 SSL	Client	1	 Windows	10	Enterprise	version	10.0.17134	 Firefox	Web	Browser	60.0.2	2	 MAC	OSX	10.13.4	 Safari	Web	Browser	11.1	
4.1	 Test	Configuration	1	Results	The	results	from	the	test	configuration	1	are	shown	in	Table	3.		
Table	3:	Test	configuration	1	results	Test	Option	 Expected	Result	 Result	WrongKey	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	SwapStartEnd	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	MissingStart	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	MissingEnd	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	LongEnd	 Pass	 Ö	 Pass	 Ö	NullCN	 Fail		 Ä	 Pass	 Ö	FOOCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	TabCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	BackspaceCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	LongOU	 Fail	 Ä	 Pass	 Ö	LongRandomSerial	 Fail	 Ä	 Pass	 Ö	SameSerial	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä		The	first	test	that	was	executed	was	the	WrongKey	test	and	as	can	be	seen	from	the	results	in	Table	3	the	test	failed.	When	the	test	web	page	was	loaded	a	Secure	Connection	Failed	error	message	 was	 displayed	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.	 This	 is	 the	expected	 result	 since	 the	 wrong	 key	 was	 used	 to	 sign	 the	certificate.		
 
Figure	6:	Wrongkey	Secure	Connection	Error	The	SwapStartEnd	test	is	where	the	start	and	end	dates	are	swapped	in	the	X.509	certificate.	When	the	website	was	loaded	a	warning	message	was	displayed	stating	that	the	website	was	not	trusted.	This	is	the	expected	result.	The	 next	 two	 tests	 MissingStart	 and	 MissingEnd	 were	unable	to	be	run	since	the	Apache	webserver	would	not	allow	the	 websites	 to	 load.	 This	 shows	 that	 Apache	 performs	 an	internal	 validity	 check	 on	 the	 certificates	 that	 are	 being	deployed	on	the	server.	 If	Apache	deems	that	the	certificates	are	invalid	then	Apache	will	not	allow	the	website	to	start	until	the	problems	have	been	resolved.	The	LongEnd	test	is	were	the	end	date	is	set	50	years	into	the	future.	The	result	of	this	test	was	a	pass	as	the	website	was	loaded	with	no	errors	encountered,	which	was	as	expected.		The	 next	 four	 tests	 NullCN,	 FOOCN,	 TabCN	 and	BackspaceCN	focus	on	testing	the	Common	Name	(CN)	field.		Three	 of	 the	 tests	 (	 FOOCN,	 TabCN	 and	 BackspaceCN)	failed	as	expected.	The	reason	for	this	is	because	the	CN	field,	
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which	 is	 the	 name	 of	 the	 website	 being	 visited	(localhost.example.com),	is	being	modified.	So	this	means	that	when	the	common	name	is	compared	to	the	website	name	then	an	error	message	is	displayed	as	they	are	different.		The	only	test	that	passed	when	it	should	have	failed	is	the	NullCN	test.	In	this	test	the	common	name	was	set	to	the	value	shown	in	Figure	7.			 	
Figure	7:	Setting	a	NullCN	In	this	case	the	‘\0’	is	acting	as	null	termination	character	for	 the	 string	 so	 that	 the	 common	 name	 is	localhost.example.com	 instead	 of	localhost.example.common.org.	This	means	that	the	CA	is	being	fooled	 into	 signing	 a	 certificate	 for	 a	 domain	 which	 the	customer	is	not	the	legitimate	owner,	and	thus	is	able	to	spoof	the	website.		A	concerning	fact	is	the	escape	characters	that	are	being	allowed	in	the	fields	of	the	X.509	certificates.	There	have	been	instances	 in	 the	 past	where	 SQL	 injection	 commands	 (SQLi)	have	been	stored	in	the	fields,	therefore	if	a	database	is	being	used	to	store	information	about	the	certificates	then	there	is	a	possibility	that	it	could	be	vulnerable	to	SQLi	attacks	if	 input	sanitisation	 is	 not	 being	 performed.	We	 would	 	 recommend	that	 the	 X.509	 standard	 is	modified	 to	 stipulate	 that	 escape	characters	are	forbidden	from	being	used	within	the	fields	of	the	 certificate.	 thus	 only	 standard	 ASCII	 and	 UNICODE	characters	would	be	accepted.		The	 next	 test	 that	 was	 executed	 was	 the	 LongOU	 test	where	an	attempt	is	made	to	overflow	the	OU	field	of	the	X.509	certificate.	 This	 is	 being	 done	 to	 ascertain	 if	 this	 field	 is	vulnerable	to	a	buffer	overflow	attack.		The	expected	result	for	this	test	is	to	fail	but	as	can	be	seen	from	the	results	this	test	passed.	The	reason	for	this	result	is	because	when	it	came	to	creating	the	certificate	the	OU	field	was	 not	 included	 as	 it	 exceeded	 the	 maximum	 permissible	value	 for	 this	 field.	This	 also	 proves	 that	 the	OU	 field	 is	 not	required	for	a	valid	certificate	to	be	created	since	the	website	is	loaded	successfully	when	test	is	being	executed.	The	LongRandomSerial	test	is	a	test	whereby	an	attempt	to	overflow	the	field	storing	the	serial	number	is	made.	During	the	development	of	this	test	it	was	attempted	to	come	up	with	a	large	enough	number	that	would	result	in	the	serial	number	being	rejected,	but	the	serial	number	is	converted	into	hex	and	the	field	grows	to	accommodate	the	larger	maximum	number	used	to	generate	the	serial	number.	There	did	not	appear	to	be	an	upper	limit	to	the	length	of	the	serial	number	and	thus	the	test	 passed.	 In	 the	 test	 the	 largest	 number	 tried	 was	321961016614730452433428166410946947104475398322062851583796333 
The	final	test	that	was	undertaken	was	the	SameSerial	test	that	 uses	 the	 scenario	 of	 two	 certificates	 on	 the	 same	 web	server	having	the	same	serial	number.		When	executing	this	test	it	was	noted	that	the	first	website	that	was	 visited	 on	 port	 3009	 resulted	 in	 the	website	 being	displayed	 properly,	 with	 no	 error	 messages	 appearing.	However	when	the	second	part	of	the	test	was	loaded	on	port	3010	an	error	message	was	encountered	stating	that	an	invalid	certificate	was	encountered	due	to	a	duplicate	serial	number  The	same	test	was	repeated	again	with	new	certificates,	and	 this	 time	 the	 site	 accessed	 through	 port	 3010	was	 first	visited	which	result	in	a	successful	view	of	the	website	and	then	the	site	accessed	on	port	3009	was	then	visited	which	resulted	in	 the	 error	message	 stating	 that	 an	 invalid	 certificate	 was	encountered	due	to	a	duplicate	serial	number.	This	process	was	repeated	ten	times	yielding	 	 the	same	result.	This	appears	to	indicate	that	the	first	website	visited	will	be	classified	as	the	legitimate	website	while	the	second	website	will	be	viewed	as	the	fake.		This	means	that	if	an	attacker	can	get	the	user	to	visit	the	illegitimate	website	first,	then	the	attacker	will	have	a	higher	chance	of	being	 successful.	This	 result	proves	 that	 there	 is	 a	need	 for	 a	methodology,	 such	 as	 the	 one	 developed	 for	 this	paper,	that	can	be	used	to	find	SSL	weaknesses	like	this.		With	having	successfully	executed	the	first	set	of	tests	the	next	step	was	to	execute	the	same	tests	but	using	the	second		configuration.		
4.2	Test	Configuration	2	Results	The	results	from	the	test	configuration	2	are	shown	in	Table	4.		
Table	4:	Test	Configuration		2	Results	Test	Option	 Expected	Result	 Actual	Result	WrongKey	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	SwapStartEnd	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	MissingStart	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	MissingEnd	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	LongEnd	 Pass	 Ö	 Pass	 Ö	NullCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Incomplete	FOOCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	TabCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	BackspaceCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	LongOU	 Fail	 Ä	 Pass	 Ö	LongRandomSerial	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	SameSerial	 Fail	 Ä	 Pass	 Ö		 The	majority	of	the	tests	using	test	configuration	2	had	the	same	result	as	the	test	1	configuration,	however	there	are	three	tests	that	had	different	results.	The	first	result	that	is	different	is	with	the	NullCN	test.	When	an	attempt	was	made	to	generate	the	test	it	was	found	that	the	code	would	not	compile	and	an	
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error	message	was	returned	which	stated	that	NULL	characters	could	not	be	encoded	into	the	CN,	 this	 is	exhibiting	different	behavior	 from	 when	 the	 same	 code	 was	 run	 in	 the	 test	 1	configuration.	The	next	result	that	was	different	is	the	SameSerial	Test.	In	 the	 test	1	 configuration	 the	SameSerial	 failed	as	 expected	when	the	second	web	page	was	visited,	however	in	the	test	2	configuration	the	test	passed.	The	final	result	that	was	different	was	the	LongRandomSerial	test.	The	test	failed	but	in	the	test	1	configuration	it	passed.	The	 reason	 as	 to	 why	 the	 NullCN,	 SameSerial	 and	LongRandomSerial	tests	had	different	results		is	in	the	way	that	the	 SSL	 client	 is	 implemented,	 since	 the	 standard	 does	 not	insist	 upon	 a	 standard	 implementation,	 it	 is	 left	 up	 to	 the	programmers	to	implement	and	this	can	result	in	differences	in	the	way	the	clients	implement	certain	functionality.	This	again	highlights	 the	 need	 for	 a	 methodology,	 such	 as	 the	 one	described	 in	 the	 paper,	 for	 testing	 SSL	 as	 it	 can	 be	 used	 to	illustrate	 differences	 in	 behaviour	 	 between	 SSL	implementations.		From	 the	 test	 results	 it	 shows	 that	 the	 Firefox	 web	browser	is	more	stringent	in	checking	for	errors	in	the	X.509	certificates,	 while	 the	 Safari	 web	 browser	 is	 more	 lax	 in	checking	for	errors.	 
5.	 CONLUSIONS	In	this	work	we	have	presented	a	methodology	that	can	be	utilised	to	test	for	weaknesses	in	how	a	client	has	implemented	the	SSL	protocol.		One	 of	 the	 main	 results	 that	 were	 achieved	 was	 to	highlight	how	the	different	operating	systems	implement	the	SSL	protocol	as	can	be	seen	with	the	NullCN,	SameSerial	and	LongRandomSerial	 test.	 These	 tests	 show	 that	 the	methodology	is	able	to	be	used	to	detect	differences	in	how	the	SSL	protocol	has	been	implemented	and	proves	the	usefulness	of	the	proposed	methodology.			One	area	of	concern	that	was	discovered	during	the	testing	was	 that	 escape	 characters	 can	 be	 encoded	 in	 the	 X.509	certificates	fields	like	Organisational	Unit,	Common	Name	and	so	on.	This	fact	could	be	used	to	encode	SQLi	attacks	against	the	CA	 database	 that	 is	 used	 to	 store	 certificate	 details.	 One	recommendation	that	is	made	is	that	the	specification	should	change	to	ban	these	types	of	characters	from	being	allowed	in	the	X.509	certificate	and	this	should	help	to	remediate	against	this	problem.		From	the	evaluation	of	the	results	it	was	shown	that	it	was	not	possible	to	exceed	the	limitations	of	the	fields	in	an	X.509	certificate	and	force	a	buffer	overflow	attack.	The	reason	as	to	why	 the	 limits	 could	 not	 be	 exceeded	 is	 because	 the	 ASN1	structure	was	predefined	by	the	use	of	OpenSSL	API	and	it	was	not	possible	to	change	this.		To	 test	 for	buffer	overflows	a	different	 approach	would	have	 to	be	 taken	whereby	 the	methodology	would	create	 its	
own	 ASN1	 structure	 and	 not	 be	 reliant	 upon	 the	 structure	defined	by	OpenSSL.		Another	area	that	could	be	investigated	is	to	examine	the	encoding	 of	 	 SQLi	 attacks	 within	 the	 X.509	 certificates	 as	numerous	agencies	store	the	certificates	using	databases.		
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